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Abstracr-This paper designs a detection system to mea-
sure QoS in differentiated services networks. The system
detects a number of bandwidth theft and denial of service
attacks. We use a distl"ibuted monitoring approach, \\lith
measurement agents collecting information about the traffic
characteristics at aU the nodes of a DS domain, and report-
ing to a central management station that performs analy-
sis to detect possible SLA violations, bandwidth theft or de-
nial attacks. We are implementing and testing the system
on a differentiated services testbed to evaluate if we can ef-
fectively detect such attacks. OUI' system can be useful in
developing mechanisms for response and damage control in
QoS enabled networks.
KeY\IIords- scrvice levcl agrcements, differentiated scr-
viccs, network monitoring, network security
I. INTRODUCTION
I NTERNET security lapses have cost U.S. corporations5.7 percent of their annual revenue, as reported by Uni-
versity of California at Davis economist Frank Bernhard.
With the proliferation of heterogeneous applications and
high speed networks increasing the demand for high QoS
in the Internet, continuous monitoring of network activity
is required to maintain confidence in the security of net-
works with QoS support.
The differentiated services (DS) framework for QoS
provides several classes of service to meet varied user re-
quirements of network characteristics such as bandwidth,
loss raLe, and latency. Packets entering a DS domain are
classified and the DS field in the IP header, called the Dif-
ferentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) [1], is marked at
the boundary nodes. The packets lhen experience spe-
cific per-hop behaviors (PHBs) as they are forwarded by
the interior nodes of the domain depending on their DSCP.
Meaningful services can be built on these PHBs. Currently
the Expedited Forwarding (EF) PHB [2] and the Assured
Forwarding (AF) PHB [3] have been defined. The EF PHB
can be used to build a low loss, low latency, end-to-end ser-
vice through the DS domains. The AF PHB offers different
levels of forwarding assurances, each with a certain drop
precedence. Typically a customer has a service level agree-
ment (SLA) whh a provider that describes the expected
service, customer traffic profile, and charging models. The
provider uses these SLAs along with other mechanisms to
provision the network appropriately. The DS architecture
is shown in Figure l.
The differences in the charging model for the various
service classes can attract attacks that inject marked pack-
e[S to steal bandwidth and other network resources. Such
attacks make use of known vulnerabilities in firewall filter
rules to inject traffic from their hosts, or spoof the iden-
tity of other valid customers. As the DS framework is
based on aggregation of flows into service classes based on
the DSCP, valid customer traffic may experience degraded
QoS as a result of the injected traffic. Taken to an extreme,
the attacks can be aimed to result in denial of service al-
together. This creates a need for developing an effective
defense mechanism that can detect and respond to attacks
on the QoS provisioned in DS networks.
In this work, we design a detection system using a dis-
tributed monitoring approach. It is distributed in the sense
that we employ agents in all the nodes of the DS do-
main to measure traffic characteristics of the network, such
as packet delays and packet loss rates. These measure·
ments are sent to a central management station (CMS),
which analyses them and detects attacks by comparing
lhem against the negotiated SLAs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II discusses related work. Section ill explains lhe
design methodology of our system. Section IV explains
functionality of our system components using pseudo-
code. Section V discusses our testbed and planned ex-
periments. Finally, section VI lists our conclusions and
discusses future work.
II. RELATED WORK
A preliminary security analysis for the differentiated
services framework is provided by [4]. The authors clas-
sify QoS attack approaches into two kinds: attacking the
network provisioning process and attacking the data for-
warding process. Network provisioning involves con-
figuration of DS nodes from policy distribution points in
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Fig. 1. DS architecture
done through automatic signaling protocols like RSVP or
SNMP. This process can be attacked by injecting bogus
configuration messages, modifying the content of real con-
figuration messages, delaying or dropping such messages.
Networks can be secured against such attacks by employ-
ing encryption of the configuration messages of these sig~
nating protocols. Attacks on the data fOf'INarding process
are of a more serious nature and can involve injecting traf-
fic into the network with an intent to steal bandwidth, or
cause QoS degradation by causing other customer flows
to experience longer delays, higher loss rates, and lower
throughputs. The authors suggest tha[ the need for intru-
sion detection and response systems to protect QoS in such
cases.
Recent work [5] studies SLA validation. The focus is on
measurement-based approaches for efficient provisioning
of network resources. Their algorilhm measures network
characteristics, such as loss rate and delay, on a hop-by-
hop basis and uses them to compute end-to-end measure-
ments. These are used in validating lhe end-to-end SLA re-
quirements. In large networks, efficient collection of man-
agement data is a challenge. While exhaustive data col-
lection yields a complete picture, there is an added over-
head. The authors thus use an aggregation and refinement
based monitoring approach. Their approach assumes that
the routes used by SLA flows are known, ciling VPN and
MPLS provisioning. Though this is true for double ended
SLAs that specify both an ingress and egress point in the
network, it is not so in cases where the scope of the service
is not limited to a fixed egress point.
In our design, we consider that there could potentially
be different ingress and egress points for any given SLA.
In addition to ensuring that at every ingress point the traf-
fic profile conforms to the SLA, we also ensure that sum
of lhe traffic profiles entering at different ingress points
confonn to the SLA. We do this by using a centralized
management station which monitors the domain for SLA
violations (Figure 2). Packet delay and loss rate measure~
menlS are sent by the edge and core routers respectively.
This enables the management station to detect violations.
III. DESIGN
The DS architecture [6] achieves scalability by forcing
complexity out of the core of the network into bound-
ary devices, which process lower volumes of traffic and
smaller number of flows. The boundary nodes where traf-
fic enlers a domain, called Ingress routers, perfonn com-
plex traffic conditioning that consists of: (1) traffic clas-
sification based on multiple fields in the packet header.
(2) traffic metering to ensure conformance to profile, (3)
DSCP marking, and (4) dropping, shaping or remark-
ing out-of-profile traffic. The internal nodes, called Core
routers, perform simple forwarding based on the DSCP
value. SLAs between customer and provider networks are
used to derive filter rules for traffic classification at ingress
routers. Therefore, ingress routers with appropriate con-
figuration of filter rules prevent traffic without valid SLAs
from entering lhe DS domain.
Though ingress routers serve as a good first line of de-
fense, attackers can still succeed in injecting traffic into a
DS domain in a variety of ways such as:
1. Attackers can impersonate a legitimate customer by
spoofing flow identity information like IP addresses, pro-
tocol and port numbers. Network filtering [7] at routers
in the customer network can detect such spoofing if the
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Fig. 2. An architecture for detecting SLA violations
subnets. But the attacks go unnoticed if the atlacker is on
!.he same subnet as the customer.
2. Attackers can devise mechanisms to bypass the ingress
routers by exploiting some well known vulnerabilities in
the firewall filters. Thus they can inject !:raffic wi!.h their
own identi[y and a desired destination.
3. If a customer has a geographically distributed network
with multiple entry points into the DS domain, he/she can
inject traffic into the network such that traffic profiles are
not violated at any ingress router, but the sum toLaI of such
traffic exceeds the profile dictated by the SLA and disturbs
the QoS of other flows.
Such intelligent attacks escape detection at the ingress
router and succeed in injecting traffic into the DS domain.
They require co-ordination between boundary routers and
the support of core routers for detection. The changes that
can be observed due to the increased traffic in the network
include longer per-packet delays, higher average buffer oc-
cupancy, and higher packet drop rates. We make use of
these characteristics, specifically delays and loss rate, to
detect attacks and violations.
Figure 2 depicts our architecture for detecting SLA vio-
lations. We use a CMS to monitor the DS domain. Egress
and core routers send delay and loss measurements respec-
tively to the CMS for the flows in the domain. The CMS
maintains a table of delays and loss rates that are updated
by the egress and core routers. In addition they maintain
the guarantees that are provided by the SLA for the cus-
tomers. By identifying the SLA to which the flow belongs,
and by comparing the delay and loss measurements against
the SLA guarantees, we can identify the SLA violations.
A. Delay Measurements
Delay bound guarantees made by a provider network to
customer traffic flows are for the delays experienced by
the flows while traversing between the ingress and egress
edges of the provider's domain. Delay measurements can
be performed using either real customer traffic or arti-
ficially injected traffic. The first is called an intrusive
approach. It is difficult to implement because encoding
timestamps into the data packets would require changing
the packets at the ingress, and rewriting lhe packets back to
their original content at the egress after appropriate mea-
surements. The second approach is non-intrusive in that
we can inject packets with desired control information,
so an egress router can recognize such packets, perform
measurements, and remove them from the !:rafflc stream.
We adopt this second approach in our design. For each
packet passing through an ingress router, with a certain
pre-configured probability Pprobe, the ingress copies the
packet's IF header into a new packet, encodes the current
timestamp tingress into the payload, and marks the proto-
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col field of the IP header with a new value, so that an egress
router can recognize such packets and remove them. Ad-
diLionally, the egress rouler computes delay for a packet of
flow i as:
The egress sends a message with the packet details and
the measured delay to the eMS. The format of the control
messages is given later.
Synchronization between the ingress and egress routers
is done by making the encoded timestamp follow a well
known format like UTe, or by using a standard proto-
col like NTP to obtain the timestamp value at the edge
routers. At the eMS, we classify the packet as belonging
to a particular SLA with a customer c, and update the aver-
age packet delay of the customer's traffic as an exponential
weighted moving average (EWMA):
If this observed packet delay exceeds the delay guarantee
in the SLA, we conclude that it is an indication of a vio-
lation or an attack. The probability Pprobe with which we
inject control packets can be configured in a way to achieve
a desired level of granularity for measurements, as well as
a desired amount of artificial traffic carried by the domain.
B. Loss Measllremellts
Packet loss guarantees made by a provider network to a
customer are for the packet losses experienced by its con-
fonnant traffic inside the provider's domain. Since packet
losses in the domain are due to packet drops at core routers,
we can make use of the buffer management schemes at
core router queues to detect such losses. Depending on
the PHB of the particular packet being dropped, we can
initiate appropriate action to detect attacks and violations.
The EF PHB is typically supported by a FIFO scheme
with minimal buffer depth to deliver a low delay and guar-
anteed throughput service. It is assumed that the network
is provisioned appropriately to guarantee no packet losses
for all well-behaved EF flows. Therefore, any dropped
packet in the EF queue is an indication of either excess
traffic from a customer or an attacker's traffic. We send
a message with the details of the dropped packet from the
core router informing the CMS of the drop. The CMS sub·
sequently concludes that a violation has occurred in the
domain.
The AFPHB is typically supported using a 3-color RED
scheme. RED gateways detect congestion by computing
the average queue size of packels at the router. When the
average queue size exceeds a preset threshold, the gate-
way drops each arriving packet with a certain probability
that is a function of the average queue size. Therefore, the
packets that are dropped by a core router can be either from
valid customer traffic experiencing packet drops within the
limits dictated by its SLA, or due to increased congestion
caused from the traffic injecled by an altacker. Reporting
only the dropped packet would not enable the CMS to de-
tect attacks or violations. We must be able to distinguish
between the two scenarios. We send additional informa-
tion along with the dropped packet, including the loss rate
of the dropped packet's flow, for that purpose.
There are several design choices for measuring the loss
rates. In the first case, the core routers measure the loss for
every flow as an EWMA:
LR~ew = a x LR~ld + (1 - a) x dropvalue
Here, dropvalue is 1 for a packet that is dropped and
ootherwise. We typically give a higher weight to the re-
cent measurement. This eliminates the need for using a
counter for measuring the total number of packets. Such
a counter could typically wrap around during the life time
of a flow. The measured values are reported to the CMS.
At the CMS, we take the maximum of the all the reported
values. If that exceeds the loss rate specified in the SLA,
then we report a violation.
In the second case, we measure the number of pack-
ets dropped, and the total number of packets that traversed
each core router for each flow, and report them to the CMS.
At the CMS, we sum the packets dropped at different core
routers for a given flow to obtain the total number of pack-
ets dropped. To obtained the total number of packets that
are in the nelwork at any time for a given flow, we need
to lake the maximum of the values sent by the core routers
as the count of packets would be duplicated, and we can-
not merely sum the lotal number of packets as seen by
each core router. Dividing the total number of packets that
are dropped by the total number of packets in the network
gives us a measure of the loss ratio, which we can compare
against the value specified in the SLA to detect a violation.
In the third case, we arrive at the total number of pack-
ets by measuring them at the ingress rather than at the core.
This eliminates the need for the core to perfonn this com-
putation for every packet that passes through it.
In the fourth case, we report the number of packets that
traverse both the ingress and the egress during specific in-
tervals of time, and calculate loss ratios as their difference
divided by the number of packets seen by the ingress. The
drawback of this approach is that the packets seen by the
ingress in a given interval may still be in the domain, and
thus can be incorrectly accounted for as dropped packets.
In the final case, we use probes just as the delay probes
mentioned before. Here the ingress copies the header of
the packet with a probability Pprobe, and fills in a special
protocol field that is recognized by the egress. At specific
points of time, the ingress sends the count of the number
ofprobes sem, and the egress repons the number of probes
it has received. The loss ratio can then be calculated by
the CMS from this data by dividing their difference by
the total number of probes sent. The disadvantage with
this approach is that we are not measuring the actual loss,
but heuristically estimating it by using probes. This tech-
nique works well for measuring delays. But for measur-
ing loss rates, this may not yield accurate results. We are
currently investigating a similar technique for inference of
per-segment losses using Internet tomography [8].
We have adopted the first scheme in our design, as it
gives a good measure of the loss, and avoids the wrap
around problems associated with counters.
When making loss measurements for the AF flows, we
have two important and inherently conflicting goals. One
is to minimize the data exchange overhead between the
core routers and the management station, and the other is
to limit me amount of state and compUlution at the core
routers. Forwarding data about all packet losses from the
core router to the CMS would relieve it of all state mainte-
nance, leaving all computation of loss ratios to the CMS,
but resulting in increased data exchange overhead. Alter-
natively, maintaining state information about all flows in-
cluding loss ratio computation would reduce the data ex-
change overhead, but burden the core routers. We attempt
to balance the tradeoff between the two goals in our de-
sign.
We reduce the data exchange between the core routers
and the CMS by sending update messages about losses at
specified intervals of time. The entries in the update mes-
sages include those flows who have their loss ratios/rales
within a fraction, typically 0.8, of the flow with the highest
loss ratio/rate. This avoids the problem of excessive and
cascaded messages that would have been sent in case we
had decided to report every loss. The fraction 0.8 was used
to avoid periodic sending of losses for flows with low loss,
compared to the other flows. Additionally, periodic trans-
mission of control messages would obviate the need for
a reliable transmission medium for the control messages.
An alternate design choice would have been to use thresh-
olds and send control messages only in the event of losses
exceeding the thresholds. This avoids unnecessary data
exchange during periods that no attack or violation is sus-
pected, because the losses are below the threshold value.
But due to the inherent difficulty of setting thresholds, and
the fact that periodic transmission of messages overcomes
the need for reliable transmission media, we followed the
approach of sending packets at specified intervals. Again,
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we synchronize the intervals by adopting a standard pro-
tocollike NTP at the core and edge roulers to transmit the
messages.
We achieve the second goal of limiting state mainte-
nance by only maintaining state for a subset M of the Lotal
number of flows. The M flow are those experiencing the
highest losses, where M is a configurable parameter deter-
mining the amount of slate information to be mainrained
at the core router. Since we are only interested in flows
lhat result in the aggregate traffic experiencing high loss,
we exclude flows with very low loss from further analysis.
At the CMS, we maintain state information for each
SLA. We maintain the flow identification information,
DSCP, loss ratio/rate bound, and the reported loss for the
flow at core routers. On receiving a control message from
a core router, we process each entry in the message. For
every flow whose loss is reported, we classify !.he flow as
belonging to a particular SLA with a customer, and up-
date the loss ralio/rate of the customer's traffic at this core
rouler. Similar messages from other core routers for the
same SLA would update the loss ratio/rate for the cus-
tomer traffic at those core routers. We take a maximum
of the loss ratios/rates of a customer's traffic reported from
all the core routers as a measure of the loss experienced by
the customer's traffic in the provider's domain. If this loss
exceeds the loss supported by the SLA, we can conclude
that the customer is in violation of its SLA or is the source
of an attack.
In addition, we check to see if the DSCP that is set
for the flow is correct. This is done to ensure that an at-
tack does not occur in the fonn of injecting packets with a
higher DSCP than allowed.
C. Control Messages
The format of the control messages is depicted in Fig-
ure 3. The egress routers send delay measurements, while
the core routers send loss measurements. We use the same
control message format for both. The code field distin-
guishes the type of message sent. A value of 0 indicates
delay measurements and a value of 1 indicates loss mea-
surements. Entries for multiple flows can be sent in the
same message, and the lotal number of such entries is pro-
vided. The identity of the flow is given by the source ad~
dress, destination address, the DSCP field, the protocol
field, and the protocol data. We have left protocol data
open in order to support different protocols over IF. We
have considered TCP and UDP in our design, so the proto-
col data in this case would include the source port and the
destination port. At the CMS, we must read the protocol
field for each entry in order to determine how many bytes













value of the measured entity for lhe flow namely loss or
delay. This should be consistent with the code field men-
tioned earlier.
IV. ALGORITHM PSEUDO-CODE
In lhis section, we give the pseudo-code for the ingress,
core and egress roulers, and for the eMS.
A. Ingress Router Functionality
for (each pkt arrival) {
'* classify pkt based on multiple fields ;/
fiow-.id =mullLfield_classify(pkt);
1* meter, police. and mark or drop the packer :1/
condition_traffic(pkt);
'* generate control packet to measure delays :{







B. Core ROllter Functionality
for (each packet arrival) {
'* classify the packet based on DSCP;/
dscp =aggregale_classify(pkt);
if (dscp~ EF) {
fifo_enqueue(pkt);
}






if (fifo_queue = FULL) {










updateJ.ossJate(pkLsrc, pkLdst, dscp, protocol, promo D. Management Station Functionality
coLdata, NO.DROP); for (every arriving msg lookup msg---7code) {
enqueue(pkt); case 0:




if (delayJeal > delay_bound) {




if (entry----l-dscp = EF) {
conclude(SLA violation by the flow in the entry);
}




if (lossrate_real > lossrate_bound) {
conclude(SLA violation by the flow in the entry);






for (each entry in msg) {
dscp_allowed =sla-'ookup_dscp(entry);
if (entry-4dscp > dscp_allowed) {






updateJossJate(pkt_src, pkLdst. dscp, protocol, proto-
coLdata, NOnROP);
enqueue(pkt);
if (pkLdrop = TRUE) (
updateJ.oss..rate(pkLsrc, pkLdst, dscp, prOlocol, proto~
coLdata, DROP);
drop(pkt);
update_loss_rate(src, dst, dscp, protocol, protocoLdata, dropvalue)
{
fid = lookup_flowid(src, dst, dscp, protocol, protocoLdata);












In this section, we discuss our testbed and planned ex-
periments.
}
C. Egress ROllter Functionality
for (each arriving probe packet pkt) {
flowid =lookup_flowid(pkt);





We use two pes, wabash and ohio, running Linux, as
routers in a testbed network. Wabash is used as an ingress
rouler with filters configured for traffic classification, and
Ohio is configured as a core router. We require minimal
egress functionality (only to process the delay probes), and
we perfonn that on Ohio. We use the Differentiated Ser-
vices support for the Linux implementation [9]. The im-




available in recent Linux kernels. and adds support for dif-
ferentiated services. The authors of that implementation
use GRED, a generalized RED mechanism with a config-
urable number of drop priorities to support the AF PHB.
Token Bucket Filters are used to police the traffic. A user
level program is provided to configure the kernel to act as
an Edge router or as a Core router. The eMS is run as
a user process on a Sun Ultra 10 machine, ganges, run-
ning Solaris. Control messages are sent by the kernel in
the core router over UDP to the eMS which, in tum, keeps
the user process waiting on a fixed UDP port to receive
the messages. Traffic is designed to flow from a source
through the ingress router (Wabash) and then through the
core router (Ohio, which also perfonns egress functional-
ity), to the desrlnation.
B. Configuration
SLA parameters at the CMS and the ingress routers, pa-
rameters for the buffer management scheme at the core
routers, the weights for !.he EWMAs, and the probability
of sending probes, Pprobe, need to be configured. Configur-
ing SLA parameters invol ves characteristics of the Lraffic
class t!lm the flow belongs to. For the EF class, it is the
maximum data rate that can be supported with the guar-
antee that no losses will occur. For the AF class, it is the
maximum percentage of packets that can be dropped or re-
marked when the traffic exceeds the profile. The ingress
routers need to be aware of the SLAs to perfonn polic-
ing.. The CMS needs to be aware of the SLAs to com-
pare the aggregated traffic against them to detect viola-
tions. The buffer management scheme we use in the core
routers is RED. The RED parameters, namely the mini-
mum and maximum thresholds and the probability of drop-
ping or remarking, need to be configured. These parame-
ters are crucial to our design, because these directly affect
loss measurements we make to detect SLA violations. The
two EWMAs for measuring loss at the core routers and for
updating delays at the CMS need to be configured. We
emphasize recent measurements. Hence, we have given
them a higher weight. The probability of sending delay
probes Pprobe needs to be high enough to obtain frequent
updates, but low enough not to generale excess traffic. We
use a probability of 0.01 (one in every hundred packets),
for each flow to generate delay probes. All parameter val-
ues can, however, be modified according to the character-
istics of the DS domain.
C. Traffic Generator
The traffic generator is a user level process that gener-
ates the traffic for the various flows. The input is a config-
uration file that has the the source IP address, destination
IP address, DSCP field, data rale, and the time for which
traffic should be generated for each flow. The traffic gen-
erator reads the configuration file and spawns a process for
every flow for that time duration. Each process fonns the
appropriate IF packet and sends it using raw sockets.
D. Experiments
We are implementing our scheme in the Linux kernel.
We are perfonning experiments to verify the correctness
of our approach. Using the traffic generator, we gener-
ate data that does not confonn to the SLAs for both delay
and loss metrics. We will verify that such violations are
detected by the CMS. Additionally, we will measure the
amount of time mken to detect the violation after the time
the violation occurs. This lapse in time is expected, due to
the fact that we report measurements at periodic intervals
of time, and typically violations can go undetected for the
short span of time taken to send and process the update
messages.
VI. CONCLUS10NS AND FUTURE WORK
We have investigated methods to detect service level
agreement violations in QoS networks. The proposed tech-
niques can aid in delecting attacks such as service and
bandwidth theft and malicious traffic remarking or injec-
tion to steal or deny service.
We plan to investigate edge-to-edge network tomogra-
phy to infer per-segmem loss rates, in order to eliminate
the need for core rouler assistance. Recently proposed
methods, such as [8], use a stripe of back-to-back unicast
packets, for per-segment loss inference. We also plan to
conduct extensive experiments to analyze the performance
of our scheme. We also plan La quanlify its complexity and
compare it to other approaches, using statistical techniques
to reduce overhead when necessary.
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